One of the keys to regional cooperation and peace in North Africa is the resolution of the region known as the Western Sahara. The conflict is a sensitive issue between Morocco and Algeria that prevents regional cooperation on economic, social, political, and cultural levels. For Morocco, the Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony that has been administered by Morocco for over three decades, was returned to Morocco as a result of the 1975 Green March and decolonization agreement with Spain. The Moroccan public and government view the Western Sahara issue as an existential matter.
According to Algeria, the territory is to achieve complete independence as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) with a confirmatory referendum under the auspices of the UN. The only current proposal for a compromise between the two sides has been offered by Morocco in 2007, who proposed a special status of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.
For its part, the Polisario Front, a national liberation movement operating from Algeria, thus far refuses to accept the autonomy plan and has failed to propose an alternative compromise solution. The majority of the disputed region is governed by Morocco and is an integral part of Moroccan territory. Its population participates in local and national elections, despite the UN designating the area a “non-self-governing territory”, pending final determination of its status. Tens of thousands of Sahrawis live under Algerian and Polisario-run refugee camps near Tindouf in south-western Algeria.
The current stalemate began in 1991 after a UN-negotiated ceasefire and has been tremendously costly to both sides ever since. The possibilities of inter-regional cooperation are extremely unlikely as long as the stalemate continues. The pressing problem is that for each side, the current stalemate is a preferable to the suggested solution of the other side. The compromise solution of autonomy would solve this impasse, and is a solution supported by the U.S. government. “We have stated our belief that Morocco’s autonomy plan is serious, realistic, and credible, a potential approach to satisfy the aspirations of the people in the Western Sahara to run their own affairs in peace and dignity”, Clinton told reporters. If it were to become fully independent, it would be one of the smallest non-island states in the world, with a population of only 200,000 to 400,000. Moreover, it would also be among the poorest, since it has no arable land and finite natural resources. Given the nature of the territory and its population, the Moroccan autonomy plan is currently the only realistic solution to the problem.
The notion that the current situation is manageable and containable is illusive. Morocco and Algeria keep a careful eye on their delicate relationship and share an interest in not allowing this relationship to worsen. And if this relationship was to worsen, it would strain the regions relations with Europe, Russia, and the United States and result in an international crisis. The Polisario Front has recently double its threats to return to violence if its demands are not met. While it may seem unlikely to some observers that the Polisario would be able to act effectively without Algerian support, the dangers of this situation cannot be neglected. The U.S. must take a more active role in pursuing a resolution of the conflict, and must start doing so now. It is in the interest of the U.S. to help the parties recognize that the current stalemate is dangerous in the short-term, and potentially explosive in the long-term.
In all, the Western Sahara dispute is indeed the principal impediment to effective coordination of efforts to combat terrorism, illegal terrorism, smuggling, drug trafficking, and to promote economic cooperation and prosperity. Resolution of the conflict is the first and fundamental step towards regional integration. It is important to note that the dispute will not be “solved” in any absolute sense in the near future, but a new compromise status, as contained in Morocco’s autonomy plan, would place the region in a new institutional framework where attention can be focused on other more pressing issues.
The Western Sahara dispute is complex. Algeria insists that the issue will be settled on terms or a timetable other than its own. Further, Russian support of Algeria has made it difficult for Western pressure Algeria at the UN, even though Sahrawi independence is not in the interest of Russia. If the use provides exemplary leadership and works closely with European allies, there are good prospects for creating an environment that would facilitate movement towards the UN-favored Moroccan autonomy plan, which is currently the only compromise solution on the table.
